Matthew Jones v. Thomas Carper by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-23-2019 
Matthew Jones v. Thomas Carper 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Matthew Jones v. Thomas Carper" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 627. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/627 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
ALD-227        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1435 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
U.S. SENATOR THOMAS R. CARPER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Action No. 1-18-cv-01383) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 2, 2019 
 
Before:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 23, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
 Pro se appellant Matthew Jones appeals from the District Court’s order denying his 
motion to recuse the District Judge and dismissing his civil rights action as frivolous pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily 
affirm. 
 In September 2018, Jones filed a complaint in the District Court, seeking ten billion 
dollars in damages for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of repeated rapes, beatings, 
and abuse, and as a result of the spread of poisoned water in Delaware.  Jones claimed that 
U.S. Senator Thomas Carper, the only defendant named in the complaint, was liable for 
the injuries.  Jones alleged that he met the defendant in the 1990s and early 2000s, but that 
they have not had any interaction since then.  Jones also filed a motion to recuse the District 
Judge.  The District Court denied the motion for recusal and then screened the complaint, 
dismissed it as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and concluded that amendment would 
be futile.  This appeal ensued. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s denial 
of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  We construe Jones’ pro se complaint liberally, see Erickson 
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and we may summarily affirm “on any 
basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Third Circuit LAR 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6. 
The District Court properly denied Jones’ motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(a).  Recusal under § 455(a) is required when “a reasonable person, with knowledge 
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of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.”  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Jones failed to make that showing, as his motion was based solely 
on his displeasure with the District Judge’s legal rulings.  See Securacomm Consulting, 
Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that 
a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”) (ci-
tations omitted). 
The District Court properly determined that Jones sought to bring claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
and that his claims were based on statutes that do not confer a private right of action.  See 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–86 (2002); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).  To the extent that Jones alleged any proper 
cause of action under § 1983 or Bivens, the statute of limitations for such claims in Dela-
ware is two years.  See McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1996).  
As Jones filed his complaint in 2018, and Jones has not alleged that he had any interaction 
with the defendant since the early 2000s, it is obvious from the face of the complaint that 
Jones’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 
U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 
Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978).   
Thus, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint as frivolous and without 
leave to amend.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint . . . is 
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frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”).  Accordingly, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
